challenge," one prominent commentator insisted that "the church-autonomy question ... is on the front line" of religious freedom litigation. 20 Another has argued that church autonomy "should be the flagship issue of church and state." 
C. The Peoplehood Conception
The third conception, equally important to American law if less fully articulated in the constitutional literature, concerns the protections that members of ethno-religious populations (or 20 peoples) require from discrimination or animus based on group membership. This approach is particularly important for those groups, such as Jews, Sikhs, Native Americans, and (some argue) Muslims, which are culturally framed in terms which combine religious belief with ethnic or ancestral characteristics. This peoplehood approach is broadly distinguished by a focus on three distinct but interrelated qualities: (1) equality or nondiscrimination (rather than liberty per se), (2) group rights (rather than individual rights or institutional autonomy), and (3) aspects of religion which overlap with race (rather faith or institutional practice alone). The peoplehood conception is as deeply woven throughout American law as are its individualist and institutionalist analogs, but it has rarely been recognized as such, resulting in sporadic and unpredictable application.
Equality or Nondiscrimination
The idea of formal equality has always been pervasive to Religion Clause practices. This anti-discriminatory model is far less protective of individual religious freedom than other approaches have been. On the other hand, thicker formulations of equality can be found in certain federal civil rights laws, which may require accommodations and prohibit disparate impacts. As the ideological core of religious freedom law has shifted from liberty to equality, its protectiveness has in some respects diminished, but its impact may run in the opposite direction if thicker conceptions are embraced.
Group Rights
Although religious freedom is typically characterized as an individual right, some commentators have observed that it is necessary to protect groups or peoples from discriminatory treatment. 34 This position is supported by three arguments. First, in any factionalized setting, weaker groups are vulnerable to oppression by stronger groups (the "Madisonian argument").
Second, when it comes to religion, it is especially necessary to provide particular protections for weaker religious groups in light of the peculiar history of religious minorities (the "Religious Persecution argument"). Third, group membership provides certain socially valuable benefits, especially in the case of religious or ethno-religious groups, including the sustenance of religious faith, practice, and collective action (the "Group Benefits" argument). These three arguments have provided a basis for securing the freedom of religious groups or, alternatively, the freedom of individuals to associate as active members in religious groups. From the beginning, constitutional structures were designed with the intent of protecting minority groups from dominance by the majority. During the congressional debates over the Bill of Rights, James Madison explained that his constitutional proposal was intended to reduce the likelihood not only that a single group "might obtain pre-eminence," but also that "two [might] combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others," presumably thereby the minority, "to conform." 35 This Madisonian Argument provides a powerful basis for the separation of Church and State and for the federalist structures that support it.
The Religious Persecution Argument has given greater strength to the religion clauses.
According to this argument, the historical mistreatment of certain religious minorities, such as Jews and Catholics, provides a compelling justification for the protection which the Religion Clauses afford. 36 Generally speaking, the egalitarian justifications for religious freedom are mostly characterized in terms of group rights or interests, despite the traditional emphasis of American constitutional law on the rights of individuals.
Finally, the Group Benefits Argument provides that religious groups merit protection not only for their vulnerability but also for the social benefits that they provide. For example, it has been argued that the "solidarity and insularity of group membership and belief sustain the insistence of many religions on one right God and one right way to homage and salvation--upon one right and insular epistemology. It is the group identity of the faithful that mobilizes pity, of the Smith Court that the Amish parents' claims were stronger than the usual religious claimants because they were based on more than one constitutional provision. 46 What is most striking about Yoder, however, is the Court's preoccupation with the unique cultural qualities of the Amish people and the extent to which their requested exemption emerges from the distinctive ethno-religious characteristics of this people. In this way, Yoder involved hybrid rights in the additional and perhaps more compelling sense that the state was abrogating not only the individual rights of religious parents but also the ability of a discrete and insular people to transmit its values and preserve its culture.
A broadly similar approach can be seen in the response of the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to claims that Sikh and Jewish students have faced discrimination in federally funded educational programs and activities. 47 Such discrimination is typically unlawful when based on a student's race, color, or national origin, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 48 a statute which does not however prohibit religious discrimination. 49 When a Sikh father sought OCR's protection, shortly after September 11, 2001, for a son who had been beaten on school grounds on account of his "faith" and called, "Osama," OCR had to reconsider its long-held position that ethno-religious groups (such as Sikhs and Jews) lack Title VI protection. 50 After much ambivalence and equivocation, 51 OCR has interpreted 52 that
When the evil day comes when the Court must confront the issue that it dodged in
Martinez, it will decide between institutionalism on the one hand and, on the other, individualism and peoplehood. The presence of two rationales on the latter side might appear to tip the scale in their favor, except that the former side may carry with it the weight of both Catholic sympathy and some forms of conservative opinion, both of which now command a majority on the present Court. From a pluralist perspective, the Martinez question is whether the conflict between antidiscrimination law and free exercise can be resolved in a way that equally respects individual, institutional and group rights.
III. A Pluralist Reconciliation: Bringing Three Conceptions into Dialogue
The differences in these three conceptions parallel differences among the American religious groups to which they have primarily been applied, respectively Protestants, Catholics and Jews. More broadly, they also reflect the differing conceptions of religion that emerge from each tradition. That is to say, religious disagreements among Protestants, Catholics and Jews reflect not only different approaches to the same phenomenon, "religion," but rather different conceptions of what "religion" is, with correspondingly different approaches the phenomenon so described. In other words, they do not merely supply different answers to the same question.
Rather, they supply different questions as well as different answers. This has always been a challenge for inter-religious dialogue. It is no less a challenge for legal discourse concerning the freedom of "religion." The three conceptions described here are not three approaches to a fixed concept, "religion," but rather three approaches based on three different but overlapping concepts.
When these three approaches are delineated in this way, the most salient ramification is that equivalent regard must, as a matter of equal protection, be given to each of these three argument is however unsatisfactory, because it proves too much. A dominant religion, such as American Protestantism, will inevitably have both historical antecedents and inter-religious influence. Nussbaum's argument would effectively permit establishment of any Protestant dogma which can claim both. The principle of neutrality cannot admit an exception for sectarian dogmas or practices which are embraced by multiple sects, or the exception will swallow the rule. Few encroachments on the Establishment Clause could not be defended on this logic.
V. CONCLUSION
The persistence of three distinct, overlapping, but sometimes divergent conceptions of religious freedom should not be surprising in a nation that has been home to three very different primary religious traditions. The tendency of most jurists has been to argue for one or another of these conceptions, or perhaps of some hybrid of two of them, in various formulations of differing robustness. Of the three conceptions, the individualist approach has been so dominant, at least during some periods, that some jurists have assumed it to be the sole form that religious freedom might take. In recent years, the venerable institutional approach has made steady headway, but its proponents have not necessarily acknowledged that there might be other approaches that would stand together with these two, Christian-inspired conceptions. The peoplehood approach should be recognized as a third, equally compelling conception, with similarly deep roots in American constitutional culture, even if it has not been as clearly identified as the other two. To understand these three conceptions, and the distinct but powerful moral demands which each 69 NUSSBAUM, supra note 2 at 58.
